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This thesis began as a study of the relationship of plan-
ning and programming to budgeting within the Marine Corps. The
fantastic complexity of organizational inter-relationships encoun-
tered early in this study diverted my attention to the basic ques-
tion of the organizational structure of Headquarters, U. S. Marine
Corps. I am greatly indebted to Kenneth W. Condit and Major John
H. Johnstone, USMC for the information and sources which they
provided in Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, Number 25,
"A Brief History of Marine Corps Staff Organization."
A good part of this thesis is devoted to the impact of
information technology. One cannot help but be impressed with
this problem when the current total organization is viewed. There
is a pressing practical need for better information systems be-
cause of the profound implications that these systems have in the
defense environment of today.
One cannot study organizations without coming to realize
the tremendous importance that individuals have on their structure
and functioning. This is especially true of a relatively small
organization such as the Headquarters, Marine Corps. The effects
of the actions and beliefs of two such individuals during a crit-
ical era are portrayed in Chapter II. Many other instances of
the impact of individuals became apparent in the course of the
study. Such factors led to the most significant lesson I learned
while working on this thesis: organizational structures, both
1








HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATION, 1798 TO PRESENT
The Early Staff
The Headquarters of the U. S. Marine Corps was managed by
a small administrative staff from its inception in 1798 until the
early twentieth century. The Act of 11 July 1798 established the
Marine Corps as a permanent organization and provided authorization
for a staff as follows: "If the Marine Corps, or any part of it,
shall be ordered by the President to do duty on shore, and it
shall become necessary to appoint an adjutant, paymaster, quarter-
master • • • the major or commandant of the corps is hereby auth-
orized to appoint such officer or officers. • . . "1
The first commandant interpreted this liberally and soon
appointed an adjutant, quartermaster, and a paymaster to serve
as his staff. He didn't need more than this because:
the Marine Corps created in 179S was built upon and around
the framework of individual snip detachments authorized
under previous naval legislation- there were some 25 offi-
cers and 53 enlisted men already on the rolls as "Marines"
before the Marine Corps was created. Prime concerns of
Burrows [the first Commandant] and his staff were recruit-
ing to the authorized strength and outfitting and disciplin-
ing the farflung ship detachments.
2
lu.S., Statutes at Large . Vol. I, p. 594.
2Kenneth W. Condit and Major John H. Johnstone, USMC, A
Brief History of Marine Corps Staff Organization , Marine Corps His-
torical Reference Series, Number 25 (Washington: Historical Branch,
G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963), P^ 2.
O

The function the paymaster served is self-explanatory.
The quartermaster designation was inherited from the Continental
Army which in turn had derived it from the British military system.
While a British quartermaster had both supply and operational
responsibility, our Congress enacted legislation stressing the
supply aspects for quartermasters which restricted them .essentially
to that function.
In British staffs the adjutants were usually the dominant
staff officers of the various command echelons. "They not only
controlled the personnel administration of the units, but much of
their prestige was attributable to the fact that they were the
staff officers through which most of the general orders were issu-
ed."! The double status of Adjutant-Inspector found in the Marine
Corps can be. traced to the combination of these duties found in
Army legislation of 1796. One of the members of the General Staff
of the Array was an inspector, to do duty as adjutant general. 2
This basic Marine Corps staff, consisting of quartermaster,
paymaster and adjutant-inspector, continued to exist for a century
and a quarter. During the nineteenth century the staff was manned
by administrative specialists who were somewhat divorced from line
duties. In 1847 Congress passed an act separating the commissions
of the Marine Corps into line and staff .3 The Secretary of the
!j. D. Hittle. The Military Staff (Harrisburg, Perm.:
Military Service Publishing Company, 1944) , p. 155
•
2lbid., p. 153.
3u.S*, Statutes at Large , Vol. 9, V» 154.
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Navy had urged the establishment of staff commissions in a letter
to the Chairman of the Committee of Naval Affairs as follows:
. . . Under existing laws the duties of the Staff of the
Marine Corps are not only incompatible with lineal com-
mission rank, but cannot exist separately. From the ex-
perience of a similar change in the Army, I do not per-
ceive any just objection to the modification proposed, by
which the officers of the Marine Corps, appointed to Staff
duty, may be required to hold one or the other but not
both.l
This concept of line-staff incompatibility divided the
officer corps into administrators and fighters
•
The military art, according to this view, consisted of
training troops and leading them in combat. The quar-
termaster, paymaster and adjutants and inspectors, on
the other hand, were concerned only with administrative
matters beyond the understanding of the troop-leading line
officer.
2
The staff of administrators that managed the Headquarters
of the Marine Corps during this era was not large.
A staff of from three to five officers, whose sole con-
cern was with routine administration . . . was all that
was required by the tiny Marine Corps of the 19th cen-
tury. Peak strength before the Spanish-American War was
only 3,660, achieved in 1865. And in a period when the
national military policy provided for wars to be fought
by improvised armies of hastily raised volunteers with
little or no prior preparation, a planning staff at Head-
quarters was not needed.
3
The Twentieth Century brought the Marine Corps into a new
era of expansion and growth.
The emergence of the United States as a world power after
^-Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Chairman of
the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, dated 20 Jan 1847
•
2Condit and Johnstone, p. k»
3lbid., p. 5.

the Spanish-American War extended national interests over
many areas of the globe, giving rise to a greatly expand-
ed employment of Marines. Beginning in 1900, hardly a year
passed without Marine forces intervening to support nation-
al policy in some foreign country. . . . The new steam-
powered navy needed bases for coaling and repairs, and,
as the United States did not own enough suitable locations
for these facilities, seizure and defense of advance naval
bases became necessary. The Marine Corps . . . was a
natural for this type of operation.
1
The change this induced at Headquarters was largely one of
expanding the three staff departments. There was, in addition,
the rise of the immediate "Office of the Commandant," a phrase
by which all staff activities outside the three departments be-
came known. In 1902 an aide-de-camp to the Commandant was assigned
This was followed in 1911 by the appointment of an Assistant to
the Commandant. Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, the second officer to
hold this office, described its duties as being
to assist the Commandant in coordinating the various
activities at Headquarters, especially with reference
to matters pertaining to military training, military
education, and equipment of troops, with their organ-
ization, distribution, and assembly at embarkation
points for expeditionary duty. ... In other words
an Executive Officer, or Chief of Staff, had become
necessary.
2
The Detail System for Filling Staff Billets
Just prior to World War I the Marine Corps revaluated its
stand on the separation of line and staff. This led to the adop-
tion of the detail system that is an important aspect of Marine





2Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, The Reminiscences of a Marine
(Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930), p. 219.

The duties assigned the Adjutant and Inspector's De-
partment are so closely related to line duties that
thorougly satisfactory performance of these duties
can only be gained by service with troops. Officers
of this department are properly assignable as brigade
adjutants; they are required to inspect troops both
in the garrison and in the field, and these duties
require technical knowledge that can only be gained
by actual experience, and as with time conditions and
methods change, it is almost impossible for a permanent
staff officer to keep himself informed of changing con-
ditions.
1
In his report to the Secretary of the Navy in 1915 the
Commandant wrote:
The detail system in the staff departments of the Army
has demonstrated its superiority over the former system
of permanent appointments. The present Army system pro-
vides that all vacancies occuring in the staff departments
shall be filled by promoting the permanent staff officers
of the respective departments as formerly required by law,
and that vacancies thus created at the foot of the lists
of such departments shall be filled by the detail of line
officers of corresponding grades for a period of four
years. The arguments in favor of this system are, in my
opinion, unanswerable, and its adoption by the Marine
Corps is therefore recommended .2
One of the factors involved in the Army's adoption of the
detail process was the desire of the Secretary of War to break up
the power centers that had arisen under the bureau system. 3 De-
tailing line officers to staff billets tended to halt the process
of self perpetuation that had long been practiced by the officer
corps within each bureau.
lu. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs,




2U.S., Department of the Navy, Annual Reports of the Navy
Department, 1915 (Washington: 1916), p. 759.
3Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 16.

While members of the Marine Corps today are accustomed to
thinking of the Commandant as the sole commander of the Marine
Corps, it has not always been so. Earlier in this century the
Headquarters was run by a triumvirate- the Commandant and his
immediate office, the Quartermaster and the Adjutant and Inspector.
1
Each had his own separate statutory existence and powers. Each
also had his own group of personnel and promotional system. As
late as 1951 the Organizational Manual, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps attested to this triangular division as follows:
The Headquarters organization is composed of the offices
of the Commandant, (including the Administrative Division,
the Division of Plans and Policies, the Division of Public
Information, the Division of Aviation, the Inspection Di-
vision, the Division of Reserve, the Division of Recruit-
ing, the Historical Division and the Director of Women
Marines) and the Supply Department and the Personnel De-
partment . ( Italics mine. )*
That considerable friction existed between these groups is
suggested by Brig. Gen. Rufus H. Lane:
The duties of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department
in the Marine Corps are primarily those of administra-
tion. It would be an interesting study to inquire into
the genesis of the division of duties at our Headquar-
ters. No doubt the present duties of the Adjutant and
Inspector's Department have been considerably curtailed,
due to a certain unpopularity of the Department. • . •
And also to the hostility between the Adjutant and In-
specor and the Commandant, which appears to have extend-
ed intermittently over considerable periods. There is
reason to believe that at certain stages the only com-
munication between the Commandant and the Adjutant and
65.
Unterview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), 2g Jan
Organization Manual , Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
1 Dec. 1951V Part II, p. 1.
3

Inspector was by the written word only: No doubt the
very long terms of office in a permanent status of
TLaTjutants and Inspectors have contributed to this re-
sult . (Italics mine. )Jl
Whatever the reasons, on August 29, 1916 a law was enacted
as follows:
No further permanent appointments shall be made
in any grade in any staff department. Any vacancy here-
after occurring in the lower grade of any staff depart-
ment shall be filled by the detail of an officer of the
line for a period of four years unless sooner relieved;
2
Since that time the Marine Corps has adhered to the theory
that the duties of all staff departments are military in nature
and that officers should be experienced in both staff and line
duties.
Organizational Implications of World War I
The advent of American participation in World War I brought
a new role to the Marine Corps and new challenge for its management.
The unanticipated involvement of the Marine Corps
in the land warfare of World War I proved a turning point
in its staff concepts. The Marine Corps expanded from
13,725 to 75,100 personnel, sent four regiments to France,
maintained an advance base force in the Carribbean, and
furnished security detachments and sea-going Marines for
the Navy. There was a need felt to replace the old ad-
ministrative staff that had been adequate for the expe-
ditionary forces operating in Latin America and in pre-
vious wars. The staff system developed by American Ex-
peditionary Forces in World War I provided the model
for a new staff organization in the Marine Corps for the
conditions of modern war.3
iBrig. Gen. Rufus H. Lane, USMC, "The Adjutant and Inspec-
tor's Department," Marine Corps Gazette , Vol. XVII, No. 2, (Aug.
1932), p. 31.
2U.S., Statutes at Large , Vol. 39, p. 610.
3condit and Johnstone, p. &•
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The Commanding General of the AEF studied the British and
French Army staffs that had developed after three years of combat.
He adopted a staff organization modeled after that of the French.
This consisted of a general staff organized along functional lines.
This was assisted by a special staff of technical and administrative
officers who helped in carrying out its plans. This general staff
was organized according to level as follows ;^
AEF Staff Field Armies Corps and Division^
(5 Sections
)
(4 Sections) (3 Sections)
G-l Personnel Same as AEF Staff, Same as Field
G-2 Intelligence except G-5 was omit- Armies, except
G-3 Operations ted. The Training G-4 was omitted
G-4 Supply Function was put and the supply
G-5 Training with operations. function was put
under Personnel
Marines serving with the AEF became familiar with this
opganization from using it in the organization of Marine brigades
and from duty on AEF staffs. They applied it to field commands
soon after but more than thirty years elapsed before a general
staff was installed at Headquarters.
The Period from World War I to 1941
After World War I a larger scale staff system was intro-
duced into Headquarters, Marine Corps. The inadequacy of the
planning encountered in World War I led to the establishment of
the Planning Section in 1918. This section was in the Office of
the Commandant and under the direct supervision of the Assistant
to the Commandant. Within two years, the Planning Section had
^Condit and Johnstone, p. 10
10

grown into the Division of Operations and Training; composed of five
sections: Operations, Training, Military Education, Military In-
telligence, and Aviation. This expansion came about because
. . . while the administrative staff departments had
brought their methods of handling purely administra-
tive matters" to a very high and excellent state of
efficiency, the need was felt for an organization
or office at Headquarters of the Marine Corps to give
more studied attention to questions which are dis-
tinctly military in their nature, such as organization
of units, matters of training, choice of most suit-
able arms and equipment, military; schooling etc.l
In describing the operation of this division, General
Feland went on to say: "... its functions are similar to those
of the General Staff of the Array in handling such questions and
similar to those followed in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations in handling Naval matters. "2
In 1920 the Commandant established the Personnel, Recruit-
ing and Educational sections. The Personnel Section handled officer
procurement and detailing of officers and men. The Recruiting
Sections took charge of enlisted recruiting. The Education Section
took charge of all non-military education. The resulting organiza-
tional chart, as of 1 December 1920, is shown in Figure 1 on page
12.
Between 1920 and 1941 the following organizational changes
occurred:-^
^Brigadier General Logan Feland, USMC, "The Division of
Operations and Training, Headquarters. U.S. Marine Corps," Marine
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1. A Publicity Section was established in the Adjutant
and Inspector's Department. This was expanded into the Division
of Public Relations in 1941.
2i The Reserve Act of 1929 led to the consolidation of
reserve functions into the Reserve Section. This became the Divi-
sion of Reserve in 1937.
3. The Aviation Section was removed from the Division of
Operations and Training and established as an independent division
in 1935.
4. The Personnel Section became a division and absorbed
the Recruiting Section in 1937.
5. A War Plans Section was created in the Division of
Operations and Training to ensure effective participation by the
Marine Corps in Army and Navy war planning. This section was
abolished in late 1941, its functions being absorbed by the M-3
section.
6. The Division of Operations and Training was redesignated
the Division of Plans and Policies in 1939. An "M" numbering system
was developed for its sections. As can be seen in the organization-
al chart shown in Figure 2, on page 14, a distinction is made be-
tween this planning staff and the various administrative, technical,
supply and operating departments and divisions. The policy and
planning staff recommended what actions should be taken, but did
not coordinate or supervise the administrative staff in its ex-













































































































































As Headquarters expanded to meet the demands of World War II
the organization proved basically sound. Some adjustments were
required. The more significant changes during 1941 to 1944 were
as follows:
1; The call-up of the reserves left the Division of Reserve
with little to do. It took over the task of Officer Procurement.
2. Personnel administration duties were split between the
Adjutant and Inspector T s Department and the Division of Reserve
and Personnel. A management engineering study resulted in the
organization of the Personnel Department in 1943, to consolidate
all personnel administrative functions. 1 This department absorbed
the Adjutant and Inspectors Department, and the Divisions of Per-
sonnel and Reserve.
3. This same study resulted in the establishment of the
Administrative Division in 1943. Prior to this each division
handled its own office services. All housekeeping functions and
personnel were put under this division,
4. In accordance with a Navy Department directive, the
Marine Corps was required to establish a Fiscal Director. The
Commandant assigned this task to the Quartermaster General as an
additional duty.
2
^-Memorandum from the Management Engineer, Navy Department
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Survey of Head-
quarters, U.S. Marine Corps, dated 2# July 1943.
Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and
Policies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Re-
organization of Headquarters, Marine Corps, undated.
15

The organization that had developed by 1944 was similar to
what it had been in 1941. It is shown in Figure 3, on page 17.
In 1945 the training section of the Division of Plans and
Policies was absorbed by the operations section. That same year
the Inspection Division headed by the Inspector General was esta-
blished. With these last two changes the Marine Corps came to the
end of World War II.
Post World War II
The end of the War was followed by a series of organization-
al changes. Among the more significant of these were the follow-
ing: 1
1. With the end of the war the buildup of the Reserves
was again important. The Division of Reserve was separated from
the Personnel Department in 1946.
2. Within the Plans and Policies Division a Strategic
Plans Section was created to fill a new need as noted by the
Director:
The workload of this division has recently been increased
through the development of plans and studies required by
this Headquarters and the Navy Department. These assign-
ments have become more frequent in view of unstable world
affairs. Their scope and the detail required was not or-
iginally contemplated in the post-war organization of this
division. . • • This section will of necessity function in
close conjunction with the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-
03M) and other sections of this division .2
ICondit and Johnstone, pp. 23-24.
Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Pol-
icies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Strategic
Planning Section, Division of Plans and Policies; Establishment






































It's origin and mission was closely analogous to that of
the War Plans Section described in the years after World War I.
3. The Quartermaster and Paymaster Departments were merged
to form the Supply Department in 1946. Proposals for such a merger
had been made as *far back as 1932. This merger was the only one
the Marine Corps made under the provisions of the Reorganization
Act of 1945 A This same year the Marine Corps was authorized to
create a group of Supply Duty Only (SDO) officers. This provided
a group of staff specialists (very similar to the quartermasters)
that formed the basic staff for the Supply Department,.
4. Contrary to this move towards functional organization,
the Recruiting Division was set up independently of the Personnel
Department in 1946.
5. The Division of Plans and Policies made a similar break
with its traditional organization by creating separate sections
for Engineer, Communications and Electronics, Research and Devel-
opment, Tank, and Amphiban Tractor, and Anti-Mechanized Defense.
The reasoning behind the establishment of these sections was that
there was a need felt for a section concerned with developing each
of the items of special concern to the Marine Corps 1 amphibious
mission*
In summary, the organization of Headquarters, U. S. Marine
Corps that existed after World War II had evolved gradually over
the years. There was a theoretical separation in this organiza-
iMemorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Pol-
icies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Recommenda-





tion between those who were primarily concerned with planning and
making policy and those who executed the policy. The over-all
planning and policy-making was the responsibility of the Division
of Plans and Policies which had the following stated function:
. .
'% its mission, as set forth in a report to
the Commandant, 6 April 1945, has . . . continued essenti-
ally the same:
"The Director of the Division of Plans and Pol-
icies formulates Marine Corps policy and develops plans
for personnel, intelligence, operations, supoly, equip-
ment and training, and maintains liaison regarding these
matters with other agencies."!
This Division was organized functionally along the same
general staff lines as Marine Corps units. However, it did not
have the normal general staff authority to supervise and coordin-
ate the execution of the policy or plans it developed. The or-
ganization chart for 1941 (Figure 2 on page 14) shows the admin-
istrative, technical, supply and operating staff that were the
agencies who executed approved policies, doctrines and plans.
These divisions and departments were independent of the Division
of Plans and Policies. They had direct lines of authority and
access to the Commandant and his assistant.
The General Staff Issue
Near the end of World War II opposition to this division
of duties was expressed. On 30 June 1944 the Director of the
Department of Plans and Policies prepared a memorandum for the
lAdministrative History: United States Marine Corps in
World War" II
,
(Unpublished manuscript available at Historical
Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.),
Part 1, dated 10 October 1946, p. 126.
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Commandant in which he urged the adoption of a general staff or-
ganization for Head quarters. 1 His reasoning is outlined in the
following excerpts from this memorandum:
. • • the current organization denies the Commandant,





These shortcomings will be discussed in order.
Supervision
The Commandant makes decisions from time to time,
which are in due course transmitted to one of his execu-
tive agencies; the Personnel Department, Paymaster Gen-
erals Department, Quartermaster General's Department, or
the Public Relations Division, After once announcing
such a decision, the Commandant has no subordinate agency
charged with supervising its execution or determining
that his will is in fact being interpreted as he intend-
ed. In short, this Headquarters is functioning on the





The present organization of this Headquarters,
because of its loosely knit form, results in each of the
several departments and divisions having an extremely
wide latitude in the delineation, interpretation and
execution of its duties. Overlap is frequent and in
many cases effort is not well coordinated. ... On
occasion, because of no precise coordination, omis-
sions or conflicting directives occur. • • •
Information
Funds form an important factor in the conduct of
the Marine Corps' business, even in time of war. As
presently organized, the Office of the Commandant, in-
cluding his advisory body, is not in possession of the
overall monetary picture. . . .
Records concerning personnel are maintained in
several of the various departments and divisions. Yet
there is no single agency where all personnel informa-
tion is available.
Statistics form an important index in guiding the
Commandant in his decisions. Despite this fact there is
no single statistical organization within Marine Corps
^-Memorandum from Director, Division of Plans and Policies
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: The Organization
of Marine Corps Headquarters, dated 30 June 1944.
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Headquarters, with the result that parallel statistics
may be found in several elements of the Headquarters.
• • •
That there has been a real and pressing need
for a general staff system in this Headquarters may
be concluded from an examination of the evolution of
the Division of Plans and Policies. By definition, it
is a planning and advisory body and has neither admin-
istrative nor- operating responsibilities. Yet the vol-
ume of business which involves the executive function
has grown so in the past few years that sheer necessity
has resulted in the Division of Plans and Policies grad-
ually accumulating executive functions, as well as many
of the characteristics peculiar to a general staff. It
is discharging these functions mainly on the basis of
cooperation. This mode of operation proves on occasion
to be most unsatisfactory, particularly when conclusions
of the Division of Plans and Policies find themselves at
variance with the conclusions of one of the other oper-
ating agencies of the Commandant. The current practice,
which is solely an expedient dictated by necessity, falls
so far short of the ideal as to be considered unsatis-
factory. In consequence, it is considered an essential
step to replace the present system with a clearly defined
general staff organization which adheres closely to the
general stall principle, departing from it in its exe-
cution only where necessary to match the peculiarities
of the Marine Corps* mission.
Though he did not express it in his memorandum, he also
pointed out to the Commandant that there was a need for a chief-
of-staff. The assistant Commandant had not been assigned this
function and, as a result, operated more like a vice-commandant,
than a chief-of-staff .1
This suggestion was not immediately adopted. The Director
2
reworked the suggestion and resubmitted it in 1945 • This time
he included among the reasons for the change a need for more
65.
interview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), 28 Jan
Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Pol-
icies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Organization
of Headquarters, Marine Corps, dated 29 Nov. 1945.
21

efficient operation and for a closer parallel between Marine Corps
Headquarters organization and that found in the V/ar Department
and major Marine Corps commands. He reiterated the crux of the
problem as given in his earlier memorandum:
Although the proposed organization resembles the
present one in many respects, the primary difference in
adopting the basic principles of the general staff is that
the executive staff sections would have definite respon-
sibilities in regard to supervision of and coordination
between the special staff sections of the Headquarters as
well as the activities of entire Marine Corps. At pre-
sent the Division of Plans and Policies has no executive
authority, with the result that there is a definite lack
of responsibility for supervising and coordinating the
execution of general plans which have been prepared and
approved. On accepting the principles of the general
staff as a basis for reorganization of this Headquarters,
it will be possible to coordinate the general plans pre-
sently prepared in the Division of Plans and Policies with
the necessary detailed planning that must be correlated
in the other agencies to execute the general plans. No
established procedure for this coordination exists at
present, except through informal liaison and cooperation
or by referring each controversial detail to the Com-
mandant for decision. (Italics mine.)
This proposal was also disapproved by the Commandant.
However, the seed had been sown, and it was not long before there
was fruit on the vine.
In 1948 reorganization was again proposed, this time by
the report of a special board. 1 The reorganization would have
been along the lines of the proposals of 1944 and 1945 > except
that the Division of Plans and Policies sections would have been
entitled the Directorates of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations
and Training, and Logistics. This proposal, very similar to
the Army organization evolving at that time, failed to be adopted.
ICondit and Johnstone, p. 25.
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Division of Plans and Policies Study 23-49
Implementation of a General Staff was urged again in 1949.
Once more its champion was the Director of the Plans and Policies
Division. 1 The need for better supervision and coordination within
the Headquarters continued to be felt. The reasoning produced
by the study conducted in 1949 was as follows:
Personnel stringencies require that each organ-
ization within the Marine Corps combine economy and
efficiency so that the maximum amount of work can be
properly accomplished by the limited numbers of per-
sonnel available.
. . . To do so, this Division pro-
poses that the Division of Plans and Policies be abo-
lished and that, to replace it, there be organized a
General and Special Staff based upon the present sec-
tions of the Division of Plans and Policies, but with
the executive staff sections headed by general officers
where possible. The resulting General and Special Staff
sections should be assigned the executive, supervisory,
and coordinative authority normally delegated to a Gen-
eral and Special Staff, . . .
One of the real innovations of this plan was the suggestion
of the Special Staff in addition to the General Staff. The organ-
izational chart of this staff is shown in Figure 4 on page 24. The
reasoning behind it is as follows
:
During the last war the Marine Corps maintain-
ed only one Fleet Marine Force, whose headquarters per-
formed many of the functions involved in the coordination
and supervision of its component parts, as well as de-
veloping the tactics, techniques, and equipment of am-
phibious operations. Today, there are two (2) Fleet
Marine Forces, and many of the foregoing attendant
duties devolve on this Headquarters. It is believed
that the organization of a general and special staff
at this Headquarters would greatly improve the per-
formance of these functions. . . •
^Division of Plans and Policies Study Number 23-49, sub-
mitted as a memorandum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
Subject: Reorganization of the Division of Plans and Policies as





























































































Provision should be made in the special staff
sections for responsibility for those functions pecu-
liar to amphibious operations. By this means constant
development of our amphibious techniques and equipment
will be enhanced.
This can now be identified as an early awareness of the
rising need for an active research and development program. The
memorandum went on to discuss in detail the areas of responsibility
to be covered by each staff section and department. There was
considerable reaction to this plan. The views of the major depart-
ments and divisions to be affected by this change were attached to
this study as follows:
Comments of the Assistant Commandant
dated 2B Mar 1949
One of the significant objections to Plans and
Policies Study 23-49 concerns the exercise of super-
vision by the proposed staff sections. Supervision is
one of the accepted functions of a staff; the others
are in general, furnishing of information, drawing
up of plans and coordination of effort. ... In the
past, although its charter did not provide for it,
the Commandant has relied in part on the Division of
Plans and Policies to assist him by performing gen-
eral staff functions of coordination and supervision.
Plans and Policies Study 23-49 recognizes a situation.-:
which has existed by force of circumstances. The
exercise of these functions by Plans and Policies
has often been misunderstood as unwarranted interfer-
ence. ...
There appears also to be apprehension regard-
ing the possibility of insulating division and depart-
ment heads from the Commandant; that a chain of com-
mand will be established from the division or depart-
ment through the appropriate general staff section,
the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff. In
this connection, it has long been understood that "a
commander's staff is not a part of the chain of com-
mand. " A staff assists the commander in the exercise of
his command functions. An officious staff officer may
at times disregard these injunctions; the safeguard
lies in the proper indoctrination of the staff.
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Comments of Quartermaster General
... I believe that the General Staff System
sets up in any organization; (sic) first, a favored few;
second, the remainder who do the work and have no say
according to their ability and experience of what is
the best for an organization. It develops the caste
system.
Comments of Director, Marine Corps Reserve
. . . Under the proposed plan some nineteen people
must now contact him rather than the nine now doing so.
Either the Chief of Staff will be swamped or, as is be-
lieved by the Division of Reserve and is the practice in
most general staff groups, the general staff will restrict
the access of special staff personnel and division and
department heads to the Chief of Staff; or the Chief of
Staff, of necessity, will direct that the special staff
and division and department heads clear their business
through the general staff section. . . .
The subject study would concentrate too much power
in the new general staff ( present Plans and Policies) for
the overall good of the Corps. It would deny access to
the Commandant of the Marine Corps by heads of departments
who are more experienced in their particular fields, and
would channelize and delay the Marine Corps administration
to such an extent as to hamper and restrict the efficient
operation of Marine Corps Headquarters.
These and other similar viewpoints were answered by the
Director of the Plans and Policies Division as follows:
The assignment of supervisory functions to
the staff is the crux of the whole matter. Its ap-
plication is the only change proposed in the func-
tioning, organization or duties of the divisions
and departments of Headquarters Marine Corps other
than Plans and Policies. The type of supervision
intended is that described in paragraph 307, Chap-
ter 3, U.S. Marine Corps Staff Manual, 1946. It
is the type practiced throughout the last war, and
now being practiced by all Fleet Marine Force staffs
and with which most, if not all, Marine officers are
familiar. It does not include or permit undue inter-
ference by the proposed staff in the affairs of
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any other part of Headquarters Marine Corps. . . •'
This Division believes the provision for such
supervision to be a vitally necessary step, one which
will obtain the many important advantages listed in
the study. In fact, only two immediate advantages can
be expected from the approval of Plans and Policies
Study Number 23-49. One is "supervision;" the other
is the institution of special staff sections to "head-
up" the most 4-mportant specialties in the Marine Corps,
and thereby provide central agencies at this Headquarters
to deal with similar agencies of the other services and
Marine Corps units.
2
This reorganization along general staff lines failed to
find adequate support even with the approval of the Assistant
Commandant. But interest in the concept continued. Later that
same year a Special Marine Corps Logistics Service Board argued
in favor of greater continuity and standardization in the area of
logistics. 3 This report stated that the "existing organizational
!U.S. Marine Corps, Staff Manual, 1948
,
para. 307, p. 3-2,
reads as follows:
Supervision:
(a) A staff officer supervises the execution of orders
to insure understanding and execution in conformity with the
commander's will. This supervision is effected by inspections
and reports or through liaison officers.
(b) Staff supervision is the intelligent observation
by staff officers, within their proper sphere of responsibility
of the operation of subordinates and the application, w hen
necessary, through proper channels , of corrective measures for
the attainment of desired results.
(c) Staff officers accomplish supervision by advising
other staff officers and subordinates of the commander's plans
and policies, interpreting these plans and policies, assisting
subordinates in carrying them out, and determining the extent to
which they are being followed, and advising the commander re-
lative thereto.
2Memorandum from the Director, Plans and Policies Division
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Division of Plans
and Policies Study Number 23-49, concurrences and non-concurrences
with., dated 16 March 1949.
^Report of Special Marine Corps Logistics Service Board,
dated 13-27 July 1949.
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structure within Marine Corps Headquarters is unsatisfactory in that
logistics planning and implementation are not contained within one
agency." Though this report did not recommend a general staff, it
did recommend a greater unification of function and responsibility
in both planning and execution phase. The Board recommended a new
organizational chart shown in Figure 5, on page 29.
The Division of Plans and Policies had a new Director by
this time. He did not agree with the view that having logistics
planning and implementation under one structure was an advantage.
In referring to the Board's conclusion to this effect he wrote:
The conclusion referred to above is diametri-
cally opposed to proven principles of staff organiza-
tion and procedures which separate planning agencies
from those agencies charged with execution. . . .
Orthodox staff procedures normally separate
planning and execution. This is essentially a system
of checks and balances, designed to insure that the
commander receives all divergent views on any given
problem. This essential safeguard has been discard-
ed under the organization proposed by this Board.
1
Thus the conflict of views about the organization of Head-
quarters continued. The structure that had evolved by 1949 is
shown in Figure 6 on page 30. It should be noted that while the
Fiscal Division is charted as an independent division, it was
under the control of, and directed by, the Quartermaster General.
Implementation of the General Staff
The change to a general staff, so often urged, was imple-
mented by the new Commandant on taking office in January, 1952.
^Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and Pol-
icies to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: Study of

















































































































































































































He expressed his views in a letter to all Marine Corps general
officers as follows:
My firso concern is with the organization of
Marine Corps Headquarters itself. I have felt — as
I know many others have — that this Headquarters
could discharge its many functions with better effect
and greater efficiency were its organizational struc-
ture simplified. I have studied the matter carefully
over a number of years and it is my conviction that
improvement can be achieved through greater decentral-
ization and by reducing the number of subordinates re-
porting directly to me.
I intend to accomplish this by instituting a
simple general staff organization of departmental
character. It will be built largely a round the exist-
ing structure of the Division of Plans and Policies, with
the G-l, G-3 , and G-4 Sections each headed by a General
Officer. Those officers will be responsible to me, through
the Chief of Staff, for accomplishing the routine duties
peculiar to their sections, as well as for supervising and
directing the activities of certain related special staff
sections.
Insofar as organization at the top is concerned,
there are three points which will be of interest to you.
First, I intend to emphasize the Chief of Staff aspect of
the Office of Assistant Commandant. . . .
Second, there will be established a Deputy Chief
of Staff to extend and enhance the supervisory capacity
of the Chief of Staff and to act in his absence.
Third, there will be established a Secretary of
the General Staff to ensure that staff work coming for-
ward for ray or the Chief of Staff's action is in fact
completed, and that necessary coordination has been
effected
.
It is my intention to separate the Marine Corps'
budgetary and supply functions. I contemplate establish-
ing an Office of the Budget, Statistics and Reports to
coordinate our fiscal effort and to concentrate in one
place the maximum possible number of those statistics
which are essential to a proper operation of this Head-
quarters.^
The organizational chart that evolved by the middle of
1952 is shown in Figure 7 on page 32. The significant changes
^Letter from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to all
Marine Corps general officers, Subject: Remarks by the Commandant
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as refleered in the new organization are as follows :1
1. The Division of Plans and Policies was dissolved. Its
four main sections were elevated to Division status,
2. The Quartermaster General was relieved of fiscal duties
by the separation of the Fiscal Division.
3. A Policy Analysis Division was created.
The reorganization did not result in the general staff
exercising supervision and coordination over other departments.
Though these supervisory capacities had been considered of paramount
importance in earlier proposals, the implementation resulted in a
relationship such that "the Quartermaster General's Department,
Personnel Department, Reserve, Aviation, Public Information, Ad-
ministrative, and Fiscal Division not be subordinated to any
General Staff section; . . . " 2
However, the Commandant did emphasize the Chief of Staff
role of the Assistant Commandant. He was provided assistance
in his general supervisory duties by a Deputy Chief of Staff and
a centralization of administrative assistance in the Office of the
Secretary of the General Staff. The Chief of Staff and General
Staff were installed and at the same time the separation of plan-
ning and policy from execution was maintained. This dichotomy has
remained to the present day.
lCondit and Johnstone, pp. 28-29.
^Notes on Conferences on Headquarters Marine Corps Reor-




Soon after the institution of the General Staff there was
another development that was to have a very significant effect upon
Headquarters, Marine Corps functioning. The Congress enacted
Public Law 416 which established a permanent strength for the
Marine Corps and defined the relationship of the Commandant of the
Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This law made clear
the position of the Marine Corps in the National Security Esta-
blishment and evidenced a determination to safeguard the amphi-
bious force-in-readiness aspect of the Marine Corps
.
The impact this had on the functioning of Headquarters
was vast because it greatly increased the administrative load of
the Marine Corps. It made the Marine Corps clearly a separate
service within the Navy Department. There had long been consider-
able confusion about the relationship between the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant. There had been a tendency over the
years to treat the Marine Corps administratively within the :\avy
Department as another bureau. This issue was resolved by the
Secretary of the Navy when he issued Navy General. Order Number Five
on 4 June 1953 • This clarified the independence of the Marine
Corps as a second service beside the Navy within the Navy Depart-
ment. However, it also had the effect of somewhat removing the
mantle of protection from outside influences that CNO had previously
given the Marine Corps. From this time on the Marine Corps Head-
quarters found that it could no longer concern itself primarily




This increased independence within the l^avy Department was
occuring simultaneously with the rise in the significance of
interservice, unified activities brought about by the newly created
Department of De/ense. Section 211 (a) of the National Security
Act of 1947 was amended by Public Law 416 to read as follows:
The Commandant of the Marine Corps shall indi-
cate to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff any
raatr.er scheduled for consideration by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff which directly concerns the United States Mar-
ine Corps. Unless the Secretary of Defense, upon re-
quest from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for a determination, determines that such matter does
not concern the United States Marine Corps, the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps shall meet with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff when such matter is under consideration
by them and on such occasion and with respect to such
matter the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall have
co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
The burden of screening JCS activities and participating
in matters of concern to the Marine Corps was initially absorbed
by the existing Headquarters staff sections. A major portion of
the support was provided by Plans Branches in the G-3 znd G-4
Divisions. As the amount of JCS participation increased the
Commandant found it necessary to assign the Deputy Chief of Staff
as his operations deputy responsibility for coordinating staff
action necessary to support the Commandant in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. He did so on 15 February 1955. 1
Recent Changes
By mid-1956 the Deputy Chief of Staff's responsibilities
lCondit and Johnstone, p. 29.
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had expanded to where it became necessary to divide them between
two offices. There was appointed a Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans who was to "assist the Chief of Staff in directing, coor-
dinating and supervising staff activities in the fields of planning,
programming, budgeting, and joint service matters. . . .- Serve
as the Commandant's Operations Deputy with respect the JCS matters. )'
In addition there was appointed a Deputy Chief of Staff (Research
and Development) who would "assist the Chief of Staff in directing,
coordinating, and supervising staff activities in the fields of
research and development. . . . Represent the Commandant on depart-
mental and intradepartmental councils, boards and committees con-
cerned with policy making and over-all coordination in the fields
of research and development , "*-
The rise in significance of research and development (R&D)
in the Marine Corps paralleled that occuring in the other services.
It was further enhanced during this era by the developmental mission
assigned the Marine Corps by the National Security Act in matters
regarding amphibious warfare. The Commandant described the Marine
Corps R&D program as follows
:
The National Security Act of 1947 as amended charges the
Marine Corps with a responsibility for development of
tactics and techniques related to landing operations.
To carry out this responsibility, the Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps directs a research and development
effort embracing tactics, techniques, weapons and
equipment related to amphibious warfare. The great
bulk of the material research and development pro-
gram is carried out by transfer of funds to the Bureaus
of the Department of the Navy. Some transfers are
made to other departments, and some work is done on




The duties of Assistant Commandant were split from those
of Chief of Staff in December of 1957. Under the new organization
the Assistant Commandant was to perform the duties of the Comman-
dant during the latter' s absence or disability, and perform such
other duties as the Commandant may specifically direct. "The mission
of the Chief of Staff was described as follows:
The Chief of Staff is the Commandant's executive officer.
He directs, coordinates, and supervises staff activities
at Headquarters Marine Corps, and performs such other
duties as the Commandant may specifically direct. He
performs the duties of Assistant Commandant in the latter'
s
absence.^
The duties of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff were not changed.
Electronic computers came into the Marine Corps during the
mid-fifties. In 1957 data processing was defined as "an inclusive
term to indicate the entire field of manual, mechanized, electri-
cal, and electronic record-keeping, accounting and data process-
ing. "3 The Director of the Administrative Division was given
primary staff cognizance with respect to data-processing in the
Marine Corps. In response to this responsibility a Management
Engineering Branch was formed within the Administrative Division.
This consolidated what had been the Management Branch and the
Machine Accounting Branch. This was done because:
It has been determined that organizational consolida-
^•Letter from Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Chief of
Naval Operation Subject: Organization of the Federal Government
for Scientific Activities; Marine Corps submission thereto, dated
26 June 1961.
2 HeadqUc.r-cers Order 5430.1 dated 9 Oct 1957.
3Headquarters Order 10462.1 dated 12 June 1957.
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tion of data-processing functions and related manage-
ment engineering services is necessary to accomplish,
most efficiently, the responsibilities assigned.
1
However, computers were purchased as they were needed by
functional departments. The first computers were purchased for
inventory contrql and were operated by the Quartermaster within
the Supply Department. Subsequently the Personnel Department
acquired computers for use in personnel management. In each case
the computer programmers worked for the department that owned the
computer. Although the Director of the Administrative Division
had over-all data processing responsibilities, he had no personnel
trained for these duties. In I960 a separate Data Processing
Division was established.
2
The purpose of creating this Division was stated in a
special bulletin issued by the Commandant. 3 This bulletin pointed
out that the division of the use of computers along functional
lines has resulted in all of the programers working for either
the Quartermaster or the Personnel Department.
Accordingly, there was no one to work on data pro-
cessing problems in other areas of the Marine Corps.
The establishment of a Data Processing Division puts
all programmers under the cognizance of one person who
is responsible for all Marine Corps interest with
respect to data processing.
It was noted that the new, centralized arrangement would allow
a better identification and allocation of computer costs according
headquarters Order 5450.2 dated 29 August 1957.
2 headquarters Order 5430.4 dated 3 August I960.
3Headquarters Bulletin 5430 dated 25 August I960.
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to use of the computer.
A major change in the Data Processing Division's mission
occurred on 30 December 1964. On that date the Data Processing
Division was redesignated the Data Systems Division. *• To assist
the Director of this division there was appointee an Assistant
Director for Data Processing and an Assistant Director for Man-
agement Systems Development. The former was assigned responsibi-
lity for what had essentially been the duties of the Data Process-
ing Division. The duties of the latter represent recognition of
the growing problems of management information systems. This
recognition resulted from a clear indication of need for action





This study summarizes the forces creating a need for an
integrated information system. These forces arise from the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, Marine Corps
boards, and studies conducted by Headquarters staff sections and
other Marine Corps activities. It calls attention to the neec for
a better capability to integrate and improve the many information
subsystems that have come to exist at Headquarters over the years.
The responsibilities of the Assistant Director for Manage-
ment Systems Development, then, includes both internal information
needs and those associated with information systems external to the
^Headquarters Order 5200.4 dated 30 December 1964.
^Memorandum for the Commandant of the Marine Corps from che
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) , enclosing Study No.
1-1964, Subject: Totally Integrated Strategic, Tactical and Man-
agement Information System, dated 16 Nov i9o4.
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Marine Corps. Though he is located organizationally under the
Director of the Data Systems Division, he also has direct respon-
sibilities to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) since
responsibility for all matters concerning management information
systems has been assigned to him. His assistant, the Assistant
Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs), has been given specific respon-
sibility for coordination of staffactivity with regard to matters
related to the Department of the Navy Management Information Cen-
ter. 1 The Director of the Data Systems Division has responsibi-
lity for technical action required for the development of an In-
tegrated Management Information System. 2 The Assistant Director
for Management Systems Development will therefore be responsible
to the Director, Data Systems Division with regard to technical
aspects, and at the same time be responsible to the Deputy Chief
of Staff (Plans and Programs) regarding other aspects of management
information systems.
In 1961 the Marine Corps established the Emergency Actions
Center.^ This was a separate office in the Headquarters, under the
cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3» Its mission as
stated in the original order v/as
:
To provide a continuously manned, secure op-
erating facility, with the capability of emergency
communication linkage with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
-i- Headquarters Order $220.3 dated 28 Dec 1964.
2Headquarters Order 5200.4 dated 30 Dec 1964.
^Headquarters Order 05400.3 dated 1 March 1961.
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other zarvi.ce operation centers a"c their primary and
alternate locations and all commands as appropriate,
which is capable of rapid dissemination of informa-
tion and instructions.
With the increased importance of Department of Defense
operational activities, the Emergency Actions Center has been
redesignated the*Marine Corps Command Center, In addition to
being responsive to Joint Chiefs of Staff Emergency Action proce-
dures it is now responsible for the following mission:-*-
The Director, Marine Corps Command Center
(MCCC), under the direction of the Chief of Staff
and in support of the Commandant and the Headquar-
ters Staff, plans for and supervises the operation
of the Marine Corps Command Center in accordance
with principles outlined in Department of Defense
directives pertinent to the World Wide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
During the early sixties there occurred a better inte-
gration of Marine Corps aviation within Headquarters. The Dir-
ector of Aviation v/as redesignated the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air),
effective 25 April 1962.2 He continued to be the Director of the
Division of Aviation. The Chief of Staff explained the status of
this new office to the Director, Administrative Division as follows
The current Headquarters Marine Corps Organization
Chart shows that the Chief of Staff has two prin-
cipal assistants who "assist in directing, coor-
dinating, and supervising. 1 ' The added Deputy Chief
of Staff (Air) likewise would assist the Chief of
-'Staff. . . . The Division of Aviation is retained
and is shown on the organization chart at the same
level as the General Staff Divisions and the Fiscal
Division.
3
headquarters Order P5000.3A, Vol. I, Para. 15000, dated
18 Dec. 1964.
2Headquarters Order 5400.6 dated 26 April 1962.
3Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the Director, Admin-
istrative Division, Subject: Headquarters Marine Corps Organiza-
tional Chart, dated 6 June 1962.
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er, the Division of Aviation was gradually dissolved.
Its functions were taken over by the Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff (Air). 3y late 1963 the Division of Aviation ceased to
exist as an organizational entity. The net result of this change
was a more centralized responsibility for aviation matters at a
higher level in the Headquarters organization concurrent with an
integration of operational activities with other elements of Head-
quarters.
The other Deputy Chiefs of Staff also underwent changes in
1962 and in more recent times. The office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff (Plans) was augmented to provide more comprehensive assis-
tance to that office in the field of both planning and programming
during May of 1962.3- This augmentation consisted of moving the
function of programming from the Plans Branch of the G-3 to the
Office of Assistant for Programs within the office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff (Plans). 2 This move was occasioned by the increased
complexity and importance of programming under current Defense
Department management. By late 1964 the name of the office had been
changed to that of Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs). In
addition to the original JCS responsibilities he is to assist the
Chief of Staff in the fields of planning, programming and budget-
ing.3 There is an assistant deputy for plans and another for pro-
1Headquarters Order 5400.7 dated 14 May 1962 .
Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans) to the
Chief of Staff, Subject: Reorganization of the Office of the De-
puty Chief of Staff (Plans), dated 7 May 1962.






The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (R&D) was aug-
mented during March of 1962 and was designated Appropriation
Sponsor for the Marine Corps portion of the RDT&E (N) Appro-
priation and was made Program Coordinator of the R&D Program.!
This office has recently been redesignated as the Deputy Chief of
Staff (Research, Development and Studies). 2 This change in title
reflects the added responsibility for coordinating the Marine
Corps study program, both with respect to internal studies and
those initiated elsewhere in the Department of Defense.
Current Organization
The organizational chart that had evolved as of 10 Decem-
ber 1964 is shown in Figure 8 on page 44. Note that since that
time the Data Processing Division has become the Data Systems
Division. Under this organization the Chief of Staff has the
following twenty-three separate activities, offices or parties
reporting directly to him:
Three Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Fourteen Division and Departments
Six Staff Assistants
Secretary of the General Staff
This mammoth challenge brings new life to the comment the
Director, Division of Plans and Policies made twenty years ago:
^Headquarters Order 54CG.5 dated 30 March 1962.
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•ent departmental organization has grown
much in the sai .. finer as a house built by a m .. ian-
ning for ah y oh tv.To and who, as time passed, hound
his family increasing beyond the capacity of the house
as originally built. Rooms have been added at random
from time to time as the need arose. As times have
changed, the design of the rooms have changed, with
the result that the various parts of the house a re of
dissimilar character. Some, of the occupants are" now
mature and n*ave children of their own, and in order to
avoid too intimate contact with other members of the
family, they have constructed separate kitchens, and
doors -co their rooms permitting separate emits to the
outside. While the head of the family pays all the
bills and sets certain standards for the complex house,
he has no means, except personal inspection, of know-
ing how well or poorly his desires are being carried
out or who is doing the housework; - and the head- of
the house is a. busy man.-'-
The purpose of this first chapter has been to trace the
development of the current Headquarters organization from its
earliest form to that of the present. There has been an attempt
to present some documentation of the thinking that was behind
many of the changes that oc cured. The next section will trace
the organizational theories involved in more general and theoreti-
cal terms.
^Memorandum from the Director, Division of Plans and
Policies to the Commandant of the I-larine Corps, Subject: The





- :IVATIOM OF THh ORGANIZATION
The Theory 02" the General Staff
In attempting to analyze the validity of the present, basic
organization of Headquarters , Marine Corps one must consider the
reasons that give rise to a staff. The head of the traditional
military organization is known as the commander, or, as in the
case of the Marine Corps, the commandant. He sits at the apex
of a typically rigid, pyramidal hierarchy. He holes the authority
and responsibility for all below him, His power is supreme and
we speak of a commander "running" his command. This is a concept
that is essential to military functioning under the life and death
conditions of combat. However, as the size and complexity of the
command structure increases, Reis notes that
... it was recognized that a commander needed assis-
tance. This assistance was provided by the staff. Its
function was to .-.her information, offer so; :ions,
recommend concrete lines of action, and oversee the
execution of resulting orders.!
This is the extension-of-the-commander concept of the staff-
It provides a recognition of his need for assistance in controlling,
directing and supervising his command or unit.
There is a second, less noted justification for a staff.
This is in the fact that there are services needed by subordinate
Ijohn C. Reis, The Management of Defe. (Baltimore: The





units that cannot be economically - . ir I vel. This
may be cue to the fact that the supcort such services require are
beyond the capability of subordinate units. It may also be I
cause the quantity of the service r.aeded does not aggregate ade-
quately at lower levels to justify -lacing the capability there.
It is not surprising that we often fail -co note as separate this
second aspect of the staff.
The logic of the rigid hierarchy of the General Staff is
irrefutable in the environment of battle. In addition, the func-
tional breakdown of personnel, intelligence, operations and train-
ing, ana logistics fit perfectly into the essential nature of
military action. As a result, the officers who head these foui
staff departments form the "right arm" of the commander. They
serve as the commander's experts who advise and plan within their
functional areas. In doing this advising and planning, a goad
deal of their time is spent setting policy, either directly or
indirectly. Within their functional areas they also directly
supervise activities performed by subordinate commanders.
.-.long with, and generally subordinate to, these general
staff officers are officers who function in a narrower, more strict-
ly functional capacity. Examples of these would be the -.egal
officer who works for the personnel officer; the supply officer
and the motor transport officer who work for the logistics officer;
the chemical-biological-and-radioiogical warfare officer who works
for the operations and training officer, etc. In addition to the
activities of these staff officers being more specialized than
those of the general staff .officer, their functions are diverse,
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even witnm the same genera- staff section. S e have -"'unctions
that are reinforcements of the general s - ff officer's directing,
controlling and supervising function. Others are more independent
,
service-to-subordinate-commanders types of activity. These officers
may exist separately, with direct lines of responsibility to the
commander, but in most cases -hey exist: within, and are super-
vised by, one of the general staff sections. These officers who
are concerned with specific, narrow areas will be referred to as
special staff officers.
In summary, then, the general staff officers exist because
the commander is unable himself to actively supervise, participate
in, and be cognizant about all of the activities in which his or-
ganization is involved. He, like other mortals, can be neither
omnipresent nor omniscient. Tables of organization have developed,
therefore, to give him a staff with which to supplement or extend
his own capabilities. This is the means by which the commander
increases his capacity to act in consonance with the principle that
"successful management depends- not alone, but significantly- upon
the ability to predict and control human behavior."-^- The general
staff officers are assisted by special staff officers who operate
in specialized areas. While this staff also performs a service-
to-subordinate-commanders type of function, under the general
staff concept we have traditionally focused the greatest attention
on the extension-of-the-commander aspects of the staff functionin .
They are, under present methods of command, the more important.
^Douglas McGregor, The Hur.ar Side of Enterprise
,
(New York.





Staff supervision and coordination is crioical to the information
thering, decision-making zrocsz^ that is the essence of mili-
tary command.
This appropri teness of the general staff concept to the
military com:...... . problem led to a love-affair between it and the
military mind that conoinu^d unremittently for more than twenty
years after World War I. This organization was considered appro-
priate for every level of Army organization. J.l. Hittle, writing
in 1949 y notes the move away from t radio ional General Staff con-
cepos that was occurring at one time in the Army General Staff.
While ac—tting some valid basis for change cue to the Army General
Staff's peculiar posioion and role in the Department, he goes on
to say:-
Yet advantage of adhering as closely as possible, from
the highest oo the lowest staff level, to oho standard
four-sectional staff should be readily apparent. This
system, the product of centuries of staff evolution,
provides for a simple but comprehensive grouping of
command and staff functions. Indeed, it is difficult
oo imagine a function that could not be properly group-
ed under one of the four general staff sections. How-
ever, since no system can be made completely appropri-
ate for all situations, one standard four-sectional
staff is occasionally modified temporarily or varied
so as to be more responsible to unusual requirements
confronting a commander. . . .
In the proper application of our staff doc-
trine such variations from the standard are kept to
the minimum, and are resorted to only when it is posi-
tively determined that normal staff organization and
procedures are inadequate for a particular situation.
The extent of this devotion to the four section organization
in the U.S. Army was commented upon by General W. B. Palmer as
folio - .
-J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff, rev ed. (Harrisbur ,
Penn.: The Military Service Publishing Company, 19491, p. 195.
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t0P eneral . . . bee ols o rue Faith
brilliantly expoun in our service schools
for two decades; c::c in the course of this exposition
we b^ca. op^c. in
. llacious theory that an iden-
. of staff nui ri: ould prevail j the
battalion through e schel of cc .... to include
tne ear Ueparoment.-'-
It _o :.Gi difficult ee trace the inspiration for the Gener-
al Staff in the Headquarters of the Marine Corps to the very
source suggested . jneral Palmer.
The Marine Corps Advocate of the General Staff
The Director of the Division of Plans and Policies during
1944 ana 1945 had 'oaen trained in this General Staff theory. He
had attendee the Army infantry School ae Fort Benning, Georgia
and the Command . 5 General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. He was proud of his knowledge of the general seaff system.
2
The belief tha^t the general e „aff system could bring eo Headquar-
ters the same tightened control ae the top which characterized
combat units is evidenced in the following ^ssage from his memor-
andum to the Commandant:
It is of the greatest im r eo note that the short-
comings outlined above are all an outgrowth of organi-
zatio. 'actors, further that they may be promptly
and effectively eradicated by the institution in this
Headquarters of an organization founded on the General
Staff system. In such an organization, these serious
wee ees involving lack of supervision, coordination,
and information promptly disappear. Until some such
organization is provided, the operation of Marine Corps
Headquarters must continue on a disjointed basis, de-
IPalmer, W. B., "The General Staff, U.S. Army," Armed
Forces I-. . aagement
,
(October, 1957), p. 10.
nterview with Lt. Gen. G. C. Thomas, USMC(Ret), on
2 8 Jan 6 5 -
50

pending mainly on coorperation for conduct of its
daily business.
1
He was not alone in his knowledge and training along gener-
al staff lines. Most other line officers in the general ranks at
this time had likewise been trained in Army schools. However, it
was he who was its strongest advocate. He became the first Assis-
tant Commandant/Chief of Staff under the General Staff when it
was put in in 1952. He contributed in large measure to the por-
tions of the "Remarks by Commandant of the Marine Corps to Staff"
on 2 January 1952 that pertained to this subject, 2 and which
are quoted in Chapter I. This document and the various memoranda
clearly indicate that it was the hope and intent of both he and the
Commandant to put a true centralized General Staff at Headquarters,
Marine Corps. The need for a General Staff with its ability to
exercise a supervisory role over the other parts of the staff had
repeatedly been stressed.
When one considers the organizational structure that evol-
ved by 1 July 1952 (as shown in Figure 7 on page 32) it is evi-
dent that 1 the General Staff was not given this supervisory power.
One might well ask what overcame the intent expressed so repeat-
edly by so many and as recently as January of that year by the
Commandant himself. The answer lies in the efforts of the Quarter-
master General.
^-Memorandum from Director, Division of Plans and Policies
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Subject: The Organization
of Marine Corps Headquarters, dated 30 June, 19^4.




The Marine Corps Antagonist of the General Staff
In a consideration of how and why the Quartermaster General
of 1952 was able to frustrate the intent of the Commandant and the
Assistant Commandant lies the key to understanding the present
organization of Headquarters, Marine Corps. In additiorr, some
yet unresolved problem areas in staffing the Headquarters become
evident.
The first aspect we will consider is how the Quartermaster
was able to frustrate the aims of the Commandant. A combination
of personality and events placed him in an unusually fine position
to prevent the implementation of a real general staff. He had had
his office for more than a decade- and had become very strong poli-
tically. It was a natural and historic role for the Quartermaster
to deal with Congress as a witness before appropriation committees.
This particular Quartermaster had during his unusually long tenure,
built a very strong rapport, both personally and professionally,
with many members of Congress.
In addition to this political power, he was keenly aware
of his statutory power. As was indicated in Chapter I, the laws
in effect at that time gave separate and distinct duties and res-
ponsibilities to three offices at Marine Corps Headquarters: the
Commandant, the Quartermaster General, and the Director of Per-
sonnel. When it came right down to the final issue, it was the
ability of the Quartermaster General to point out the legality
of his independent position that prevented his Supply Department
from being placed under the supervision of the G-4» He pointed
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out that regardless of what organizational structure was created,
he would continue to perform his statutory duties.
1
We have seen how the Quartermaster prevented the installa-
tion of the General Staff. We might now ask why he so acted.
The Line Versus The Staff
The Quartermaster General resisted the General Staff be-
cause he felt that the interests of the Supply Department were
threatened. This feeling arose from the fact that a line officer
would have been placed in a supervisory position over the Supply
Department. The Quartermaster General would not have been accept-
able as the G-4 in the new General Staff .2 This is consistent
with the history of the struggle outlined in Chapter I within the
triumvirate of the Office of the Commandant (staffed by line offi-
cers^ the Supply Department (staffed by quartermasters), and the
Personnel or Adjutant-Inspector Department. As evidenced in the
various memoranda quoted in Chapter I, it was the desire of the
line officers to put line officers clearly in a supervisory capa-
city over the departments that were considered analogous to the
special staff. That is, the line officers such as the Director
of Plans and Policies felt that there should be a general staff to
supervise and coordinate the departments that consisted of special-
ists (typified by the supply duty only officers or quartermasters)





who were concerned with more narrow, functional areas. It would
be inconsistant with this basic philosophy to install a specialist
(the Quartermaster General) in a General Staff billet. The General
Staff concept required a person with broad line experience and
background.
The Quartermaster General, on the other hand, felt it ab-
solutely essential to have someone highly qualified in the func-
tional area to supervise the supply function. He questioned the
ability of a line officer with little or no previous supply ex-
perience to properly perform a supervisory function in the supply
area.l
The conflict can now be recognized in its most fundamental
question: What should be the qualifications of the staff officer
who supervises, directs and controls a functional area? The con-
flict between the staff specialist (typified by the quartermaster,
after 1946 called a "supply duty only" officer) , with detailed
knowledge in a narrow, functional area versus the general staff
officer, a man with varied duty experience, is deeply embedded
in this issue. In Chapter I it was. pointed out that the Marine
Corps committed itself to the separation of the two in 1847 and
then it reversed its stand in 1917. We might ask if it did so
in a responsible manner.
Ideally the conflict between the staff specialist and the
line officer would be resolved by a compromise solution, resulting
in the best of both approaches. The aim of detailing is to co




billets constant infusions of line experience and outlook. In
addition, the line officer corps will develop more detailed know-
ledge of the functional staff areas.
If we examine this general statement we can see a cause of
difficulty. From the viewpoint of developing good line officers
,
the more varied the staff experiences the better. From the view-
point of developing good staff officers, with real insight into
the various functional areas, the more similar the staff experi-
ences, the better. Since the detail system was installed at the
same time as the elimination of separate corps of staff specialists
it seems obvious that its original purpose was to provide an alter-
native source for good staff officers. Because the detailing
system has since focused on developing better line officers, it
has failed to adequately achieve its original purpose. This
failure justifies the concerns of the Quartermaster General. The
use of the detail system with primary stress on developing line
officers leaves unanswered the problem of filling technical staff
billets.
The problems created by the resulting 1952 organization
were many. The confrontation between the General Staff advocates
and the interests represented by the Quartermaster General result-
ed in an organizational structure that failed to simplify the or-
ganization and failed to provide the supervision, coordination,
and control intended. Once it was determined that the separate
departments and sections could not be placed under the General
Staff the value of implementating the General Staff became ques-
tionable. The structure that resulted in 1952 lacks elements
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essential to the realization of the benefits of a General Staff
structure-tight control at the top by the use of a small functional
staff. Instead of creating clear, functional general staff sec-
tions the new organization increased confusion by increasing the
total number of personnel who report to the Chief of Staff and by
installing duplication in the number of people who report directly
to him in some functional areas. The specific problems to which




AN APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION
Overlap of Responsibilities
One can nowhere find a statement of the theory under which
Headquarters, Marine Corps is organized. The reason for this is,
of course, that the structure that has been adopted has no support-
ing theory. As was narrated in the last chapter, it was never
even intended. It is two systems, an old alongside a new that
was to replace it.
Since the adoption of the present organization, several
rationales have arisen that attempt to explain it as based on
valid theory. It is sometimes stated that the General Staff is
concerned with the plans and policies and the Division and Depart-
ments are concerned with the execution of these. Another justifi-
cation is that the General Staff is concerned with Marine Corps
wide interests, as opposed to the narrow, functional viev/s of the
operators.
^
The first, general objection to these theories is that even
were they valid, the duplication of responsibility in functional
areas tremendously complicates the problem of coordination and
control. People who attempt to work at Headquarters are acutely
aware of this. An organizational structure should have exactly




the opposite effect. Organizational structures exist to simplify
and assist in the coordination and control effort.
A second objection is that the duplication deprives people
working at Headquarters of the satisfaction of having broad res-
ponsibilities within a defined functional area. The system is
based on the premise that one can stop the doers from thinking and
the thinkers from doing without adverse effects on morale. This
is a questionable principle in a human system.
A third objection, allied to the first, is that the present
organization inherently creates confusion. While clear, sharp
lines of responsibility will seldom exist, they should be sought
as an objective. The potential for duplication of responsibility
under current organization is in direct contrast with this objec-
tive. The present organization requires that a great deal of time
and effort be continually devoted to the problem of determining
division of responsibility. In addition to being wasteful, this
is destructive of morale among those who attempt to operate on
the working level. No matter how carefully the division of duties
is worked out on the basis of plans and policies versus operations,
it is a task that is never done. Issues constantly arise. Now,
after more than two decades, there is still considerable duplica-
tion. This overlap exists even in assigned missions and functions.
The following examples of possible areas of confusion are taken
from current Headquarters Manual, Volume II .1
The mission of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-l, is re-
stricted to formulating plans, policies and instructions regard-
headquarters Order P500.3A, Change 2, dated IB Dec. 64.
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ing manpower and personnel matters. However, among his functions
listed the exercise of centralized control over the allocation
and distribution of available manpower, military and civilian,
within the Marine Corps. He is also to exercise staff supervision
to ensure compliance with the Commandant's orders and instructions
dealing with manpower and personnel matters. At the same time,
the mission of the Director of Personnel includes responsibility
for the distribution of officers and enlisted personnel. This
gives rise to the question of the difference between the distribu-
tion of manpower (a G-l function) and the distribution of officers
and enlisted personnel (a Personnel Department function).
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is concerned with the
formulation of policies, plans, and programs in various operational
areas. The first of the stated functions of the G-3 is to develop
and coordinate military policy for the Marine Corps as it relates
to employment, force requirements, and readiness systems. The
second function is to coordinate military policy and strategic
and operational matters, as required, with the staff of the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Joint Staff. At the same time, the
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) is to coordinate staff
action in matters pertaining to Joint Chief of Staff participation
and assist in the directing, coordinating, and supervising of
staff activities in the fields of planning, programming and budget-
ing. Where do the responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of Staff
(Plans and Programs) end and those of the G-3 begin?
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, is responsible in his
mission for logistics plans and policies and the determination of
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requirements and program objectives and programs relating to
material readiness. His functions include responsibility for
planning, coordinating, and supervising the material programs for
the logistic support of the Marine Corps. Kis operational counter-
part, the Quartermaster General, is given the mission of responsi-
bility for the management of the Marine Corps Supply System. There
would seem to be need for plans and policies (a G-4 function) in
fulfilling the management responsibility (Supply Department). It
is not surprising that the Supply Department has a Plans, Programs,
and Systems Office. Other Supply Department functions include
the computation of material requirements for the peacetime opera-
ting forces and mobilization plans of the Marine Corps and the
procurement and administration of all logistical services required
by the Marine Corps. The G-4 and Supply Department responsibilities
thus provide the widest possible base for misunderstanding.
The point of narrating these areas of mission and function
conflict within the organizational structure of Headquarters is
not to prove that the system cannot work. It has been made to
work by Marines. But it should be obvious that in making the
organization work these areas of confusion require constant defini-
tion and redefinition. This unnecessarily raises the price Marines
must pay to make the system work.
A fourth objection to the plans and policies versus opera-
tors dichotomy is that the duplicate staffing that results is
unnecessary. It need not exist along with the philosophy of the
detail system. The main point of the detail system is to staff
the Headquarters with officers with line experience. These men
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have had broad, Marine Corps wide experience. They are the best
qualified to be concerned with and deal with Marine Corps wide
interests. They are generalists by training and experience. The
additional creation of both generalist and specialist structures
within the Headquarters organization is therefore redundant.
A last objection to the separation of the planners from the
operators has been expressed as follows:
The only persons who can and do translate policy-state-
ments of aspirations into operational reality are tnose
charged with performing the various tasks constituting
the performance or output of the organization. Conver-
sely, they are the only ones in the organization with the
information, ideas, and suggestions necessary for strong,
imaginative and effective policy. When the entire "chink-
ing and planning function is assigned to a "think group''
,
or a planning staff, there is a question that these groups
simply are not qualified to answer: Is the policy or
plan adapted to reality?l
The Changing Mission of the Commandant
It is in some ways ironic that the General Staff concept
was implemented, however feebly, in 1952. With hindsight it is
apparent that that was the very time at which the General Staff
structure became inappropriate for the management of Headquarters,
Marine Corps. The General Staff is intended to assist the military
commander of troops under operational conditions. The four func-
tional sections are appropriate to the areas of concern to him.
They are hardly descriptive of the total, major functional res-
ponsibilities of the Commandant today. Since the staff exists




ponsibilities will help in evaluating the appropriateness of his
staff organization.
Until after World War II the exact duties and responsibi-
lities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps were vague and. indefin-
ite. We can say, however, that he was primarily concerned with
activities within the Marine Corps. He was under the protective
mantal of the Chief of Naval Operations and other Navy Department
Offices against external forces. Under these conditions the
General Staff organization may have been appropriate.
However, with the National Security Act of 1947 as amended
by Public Law 416 his duties and responsibilities changed. The
orientation of his duties became increasingly external zo the
Marine Corps and even to the Navy Department. A greater part of
the Commandant's effort is given to participation in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and in Defense Department activities. He also
has an increased responsibility for Research and Development.
Inflexibility of the General Staff Concept
It is evident that such activities and areas of responsi-
bility are not well suited to the General Staff limitation of four
functional areas. It has been suggested that the existence of the
General Staff hampers the proper recognition and handling of new
major areas of concern. In relating the process of change by
which the Army abandoned the General Staff organization, General
Palmer states:
In 1946, when General Eisenhower reorganized the War De-
partment from peacetime, the old numberec 'Assistant




. . . The payoff of abolishing the magic num-
bers was the appearance of research and development on
the same level with the former owners of numbers; for
so long as the General Staff had those numbers, it was
very difficult to provide stature for a new function
when it appeared. And if it did not get a number, it
was not likely to acquire stature among people who had:
learned that all General Staff activities numbered G-
something. . . . the top command was being called
upon to take charge of another, a very significant,
function which had no sacred number: control of the
money.
So a detached observer could have seen by 1950
that the dogma of the Sacred Numbers was becoming a
strait jacket . ... he could have seen that Deputy
Chiefs of Staff were being created merely to get around
the rigidities of the G-l, 2, 3, 4, scheme of things.!
An analogy to this concept can clearly be found in the
Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS) of the Marine Corps. The first DCS
was provided simply as an assistant to the Chief of Staff. Then
he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, which included specific
responsibility for participation in JCS plans. (It is interesting
to note that after World War I and II this need was met by the
equivalent of a G-5 section) . When Research and Development rose
in importance during the fifties, another DCS was added. As
General Palmer suggests, this type of evolution occurred because
these offices would not find a resting place in the General Staff
functional structure.
As these more appropriate staff offices have been created
they have taken over many responsibilities previously held by the
General Staff. Recent developments took important planning res-
ponsibilities performed by the G-3 and moved them to the Deputy




ducted by the G-4 and Supply Department have likewise been moved
to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Research and Development). These
changes are attributable to several causes, but chief among these
is the need to have more effective control of these new "func-
tional" areas. The Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs)
initially was to coordinate the General Staff only. The General
Staff sections were responsible for doing; the work under his super-
vision and coordination. However it became apparent that the effi-
cient execution of this function required an organization with
greater control and unity. The same reasoning accounts for the
centralization of the Research and Development function. It is a
simple fact that when an activity becomes important to the Comman-
dant, and fast, efficient action is required, a separate functional
organization arises to meet the need. This reaction is entirely
appropriate. It is unfortunate that it comes about because of
urgent need and in spite of the existing organization rather than
because of thoughtful planning. There has not been an adequate
revaluation of the old along with the imposition of the new.
Continuous revaluation of the basic organizational structure should
be performed. Because of a failure to do this there has been a
continual compounding of the complexity of interrelationships
that started in 1952.
In summary, the major forces for change since 1952 have
been met in the Marine Corps by offices that struggled to the
surface at the Deputy Chief of Staff level. They exist there not
because of any theoretical basis in General Staff organizational
theory. Rather, they simply didn't fit into the traditional
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General Staff structure and the Deputy Chief of Staff level was
the only place to put them where they would be effective. The
Deputy Chiefs of Staff serve well the major responsibilities
of the Commandant which have evolved during the last decade. The
problem is that there has been no basic revaluation and reorganiza-
tion of the other staff agencies that support him. As a result,
the imposition of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff level within the
Headquarters has compounded the confusion of responsibilities that
exist under the General Staff/separate departments and oivisions
dichotomy installed in 1952.
The next chapter will discuss a new force for change ^hat
is growing in its dimension and is rapidly becoming of major
importance to the mission of the Commandant- information technology
The recent move to recognize the importance of this within the
Data Systems Division (outlined in Chapter II) indicates that it
will be forced to struggle to the surface much as did Plans,
Programs, Studies and R&D. Hopefully it will have the stamina




IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
The Advent of Information Technology
Among the forces acting upon the management of the Marine
Corps today there is probably no area of equal importance with
information technology. Since the nature of this new technology
is nebulous and even largely unidentified in current organiza-
tional thinking, an attempt to define its significance should be
made. The basic source of the problem is the computer. Computers
are relatively new and are thought of as fast data processors.
Originally they were simply that. However, the implications they
have for management systems such as Headquarters, Marine Corps go
far beyond simple data processing. The challenge of information
technology is that it poses questions as new and foreign as the
computers themselves. While the problems of information techno-
logy are not as obvious as those of research and development and
planning, it is similar to them in that it provides a new func-
tional area that does not fit within the General Staff structure.
The aim of this chapter is to show that it is also like them in
its importance to the mission of the Marine Corps.
By information technology is meant what Leavitt and Whisler
described as including the following:
1. Technique for processing large amounts of




2. The application of statistical and mathema-
tical methods to decision-making problems; it is repre-
sented by techniques like mathematical programming, and
by methodologies like operational research.
3. The simulation of higher-order thinking
through computer programs.
1
It is because of ever increasing complexity that there has
-
universally been found the push to develop information technology.
Increased complexity and the inability of any one man or small
group of men to alone handle all the inputs to our broader, more
complex decision-making has led to giving increased attention to
the information processes in our organization. It became apparent
that the decision-maker needed help. "... The obvious impact
of the steadily increasing size, complexity, and geographic dis-
persion of organizations has been to accentuate the importance of
having instrumentalities for informing management as to the results
and status of operations."2 The aim of information systems typi-
cally is to devise information collecting and analytic systems
that will ensure, as much as possible, that no essential facts or
variables are disregarded in making our decision. It is the compu-
ter that has given us a superhuman data collection, data handling
and mathematical capability. The computer has, in turn, become a
necessity for the use of the divers and highly sophisticated tech-
niques used in solving the complex decision situations that it
made possible.
lHarold J. Leavitt and Thomas L. Whisler, "Management in
the 1960»s," Harvard Business Review , (Nov. -Dec, 1958), p. 41.
2 Joseph Pois, "Evolutionary Role of the Financial Execu-
tive," Federal Accountant , Vol. XI, No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 39.
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The use of quantitative analysis has become and will in-
creasingly become a necessary tool for the military commander at
every level. The stress on efficiency in our decision-making
process and the capabilities of the computer has led to "increased
reliance on systematic quantitative analysis to determine the most
efficient alternative allocation and methods."* Otherwise accurate,
timely analysis of the decision situations will become beyond the
commander's capabilities because he could neither collect the data
nor be certain to properly consider all decision situation elements.
This use of information technology typically starts at high
levels, but it brings about changes that induce its use at lower
and lower levels. All levels will inevitably become engaged. In
recent times one could observe the stress on data collection and
analytic techniques start at the Department of Defense and then
descend to the service department level. This year, major Marine
Corps commands and bases have received their first capability in
this direction- IBM 1401 computers. In the areas of supply and
tactical data wider use of computers is fait accompli. The move
is now towards integrated information systems. It can be said
without conjecture that the trend toward the tie-in of separate
data systems into total, integrated information systems is clear
and inevitable.
^Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of




The Rising Level of Decision Making
For many years there was a trend in both the Marine Corps
and industry towards decentralization of command. The inability
of the central headquarters to collect and properly evaluate all
the data led to this stress on decentralization. The decision-
making process was increasingly placed at a lower level, where the
volume of data was less; where the commander was closer to the
facts; where fewer facts would be omitted; and where, therefore,
a better decision could be mad©.
Up to 1955 no means, mechanical or otherwise was
available to assure the manager that he has before him
all relevant information bearing on the decisions he has
to make. Consequently, decision-making, until relatively
recently, has been an extremely risky business. In the
absence of methods by which information could be collected
and intelligently disseminated, it was thought to be ne-
cessary to decentralize the information gathering and
dissemination process, in order to be able to operate
at all, . • . The existence of computers and a new in-
formation technology have made the organizational con-
cepts upon which arguments such as these are based com-
pletely obsolete.
1
Though this was said of a business environment, it is
equally true of Headquarters, Marine Corps. The ability, through
automatic data processing, to have facts collected at higher and
higher levels will inevitably lead to more decision-making at those
levels. This allows for tighter control at the top. It also per-
mits decision-making at a level that sees the operation as a whole
and therefore understands, in the broadest sense, the decision
situation. A centralized concentration of the personnel and equip-
iGerald G. Fisch, "The Integrated Management Organization,"
Financial Executive, (May, 1964), PP. 13-14.
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ment used in the information technology allows a higher level such
as Headquarters to better cope with the increasingly complex,
highly analytic techniques involved in the decision-making process
at responsible levels.
If centralization becomes easier to implement,
managers will probably revert to it. Decentralization
has, after all, been largely negatively motivated. Top
managers have backed into it because they have been un-
able to keep up with size and technology. They could
not design and maintain the huge and complex communica-
tions systems that their large, centralized organization
needed. Information technology should make recentrali-
zation possible. It may also obviate other major rea-
sons for decentralization. For example, speed and flex-
ibility will be possible despite large size, and top
executives will be less dependent on subordinates be-
cause there will be fewer "experience" and "judgment"
areas in which the junior men have more working know-
ledge. In addition, more efficient information-pro-
cessing techniques can be expected to shorten radi-
cally the feedback loop that tests the accuracy of
original observations and decisions.
1
There is no reason to believe that this will tend to be
any less true of the military profession than elsewhere. V/e
already see great strides in this direction within the Defense
Department
•
The Evolving Use of Information Technology
Within the Marine Corps
The present and natural trend in the development and im-
plementation of processes for the gathering and use of information
in the Marine Corps is along functional lines. There have been
dramatic and pioneering advances in the inventory control field
conducted by the Supply Department. The personnel accounting
system is developing its own data collection processes. Dis-
^eavitt and Whisler, p. 43
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bursing is involved in an automated pay system. In each field
data collection provides the basis for an increased information
flow, decision making techniques based on quantitative analysis,
and, from these, improved management.
The hue and cry for integrated data systems has been made
in the interest of eliminating duplication and reducing personnel
and equipment requirements. While a simultaneous revaluation of
the concepts of organization and functional breakdown of areas of
responsibility might be appropriate, it has not been suggested.
Rather, a day of great improvement in efficiency of our present
organizational structure is seen ahead. The general staff, at all
levels, now busy with data collection and the preparation of re-
ports to higher authorities will be released from most of its
repetitive, mundane tasks. The structured duties of the function-
al staff will be automated. Because of increased capabilities,
more reliable and detailed information will be available. The
general staff of tomorrow will be armed with better information.
It will have more time and better information resources to devote
to assisting the commander in controlling, directing and super-
vising his unit.
The advent of information technology can, then, be seen
as providing increased effectiveness and opportunity for every
commander and his staff. Logically it will result in greater
centralization and higher levels of decision making. Computer
applications will continue to develop along the same functional
lines as the general staff and increase its efficiency and power.
But a warning can be heard from the field of business management.
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A suggestion is made:
Organizations can be thought of as lively sets
of interrelated systems designed to perform complica-
ted tasks. We can try to minipulate at least three
dimensions of those systems in order to get the per-
formance of tasks changed or improved. We can mini-
pulate the organization structure ... we can mini-
pulate the tools and techniques used in the system.
... We can enter from the people side, to change
bodies, or attitudes, or inter-personal relation.
. • . But we must never for a moment forget that
when we tamper with any one of these three variables t
structure or technology or people we are likely to
cause significant effects on trie others as well as
on the task . (Italics mine.)l
The Effects on Subordinates of the Evolving Use
There are many adverse effecits that could be prophesied
if the use of information technology continues to develop within
the Marine Corps as we have just described. We should look close-
ly at the whole result rather than just the beneficial results
obtained from tightened controls that are apparent. It is the
effects upon the personality traits and general development of
subordinates involved in following this naturally evolving pattern
that should become of prime concern. A greatly tightened control
system would be destructive of characteristics that are critically
needed in an organization with the mission of the Marine Corps.
There are many effects which we might anticipate. The
first factor that will cause disruption is the rising level of
decision making. How will the subordinate commander, be he a
platoon commander or a commanding general, perceive this change?
It has been observed that: "The role of authority in administra-
xHarold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (2d. ,ed.)
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 325.
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tion is often misunderstood by subordinates who may feel that
the making of a decision at a higher level bespeaks a lack of
confidence in them."l
In more specific response to our question:
... we would predict that such a development eleva-
tion of the level of decision-making will be accompan-
ied by hostile attitudes and resentment, not only among
nonsupervisory personnel, but also among lower and mid-
dle levels of management. . . • Hostile attitudes will
lead not only to the poorer execution of decisions based
on analysis provided by the computer, but also to feed-
ing the computer distorted and inaccurate information
and measurements. The people involved will alter the
data to protect themselves.
2
Not only will the level of decision-making rise, but also
an emancipated general staff, organized along functional lines,
will be there to assist the commander in perfecting the system.
This means the inducement of tighter and tighter controls since
the staff will be free to spend more time expanding its interests.
Data on more and more detailed functions can be collected. Closer
and closer analysis can be made. More policies can be establish-
ed. And there can be more supervision to ensure the policies are
followed.
The support of this increased capability of the general
staff would result in reports being required or data somehow col-
lected in areas that traditionally had been left entirely to the
subordinate. Such reports would have generated too much detail
to be handled by upper echelons of command before the computer.
lJoseph D. Cooper, The Art of Decision Making (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1961) , p. 95.
2Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961), p. 210.
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These areas of uncollected data have always represented a threat
to the general staff in that they were areas of uncertainty. The
aim of the general staff is to reduce uncertainty, It seems
easy to predict that the greater their capacity to collect data,
the more data they will in fact collect.
The subordinate sees this data collection as a threat.
He sees it as a sharing process- a giving up of part of what
had been exclusively his. The more information the subordinate
feels is removed from his exclusive control, the greater will be
the reduction in his sense of importance and personel worth.
Greater supervision means a confirmation of what the rising level
of decision making also suggests- a decreasing trust in him.
In our society the physiological needs have been gener-
ally satisfied. It is at the higher social and egoistic level
that men have their greatest need and commanders will today find
their greatest challenge. The egoistic needs are of two kinds: 1
1. Those that relate to one's self-esteem: needs for
self-respect and self-confidence, for autonomy, for achievement,
f6r competence, for knowledge.
2. Those that relate to one's reputation: needs for
status, for recognition, for appreciation, for the deserved res-
pect of one's fellows:
It is at these egoistic needs that the effects of the
evolution of control processes that is occurring will strike.
They tend to reduce what few satisfactions our present command




McGregor writes that people, deprived of opportunities to satisfy
at work the needs which are now important to them will behave as
follows: n
. . . with indolence, passivity, unwillingness to
accept responsibility, resistance to change, willingness to
follow the demogogue, unreasonable demands for economic benefits. "-
The new era will bring an increased capability to the
traditional leadership role. This should cause us to revaluate
our concepts of this role. Argyris suggests that:
Following the logic of specialization the planners create
a new function (leadership) whose primary responsibility
shall be the control, direction, and coordination of the
interrelationships of the parts and to make certain that
each part performs towards objective, adequately. . • •
The impact of such a state of affairs is to make the in-
dividuals dependent upon, passive toward, and subordin-
ate to the leader. As a result the individuals have
little control over their working environment. Con-
comitantly, their time perspective is shortened be-
cause they do not control the information necessary
to predict their future. . . . These requirements
of formal organization act to inhibit four of the
growth trends of the personality: adults who are
passive and subordinate, and who have little con-
trol and time perspective, exemplifying dimensions
of immaturity, not adulthood. 2
In the Marine Corps, where there has always been this
specialization, leadership is a function of critical importance.
In the environment of combat, where life and death are at stake,
it is imperative to have the unquestioned authority to control,
direct and coordinate. Yet the Marine Corps cannot afford to
foster the characteristics listed above. It has purposely and with
great effort worked against them in the past. Dependency, passive-
ilbid
., p. 42.
2Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New York:
Harper Brothers, 1957), pp. bO-bl.
75

ness and indifference are anathema to the objectives of the Marine
Corps. Yet it is in danger of fostering them in the years ahead
by the imposition of greatly tightened control systems. In the
name of efficiency it may promote ineffectiveness . There is
special need to be alert to this problem because it is difficult
to demonstrate in a cause-effect relationship. That is, it is
hard to prove that the characteristics Argyris suggests will be
produced by tightened "leadership" controls. This is in marked
contrast with how clearly we can see the direct beneficial effects
of tightened control within our military organizational structures
As Likert notes:
The measurement of such end-result variables as
production, costs, etc. combined with skillful use of
scientific management and related principles and pro-
cedures, provides a body of evidence showing that tight-
er job organization and tighter budgetary and other
controls yield improved results. . . . More companies
are extending and increasing the use of performance
measurements and indexes, measured day work, and simi-
lar developments. Comparable trends are also occur
-
ing in the use of budgets and budgetary controls, with
the decisions on budgets often highly centralized.
Accompanying these developments are a feeling of in-
creased hierarchical pressure and a growing resent-
ment against it. . • . Until the intervening variables
such as perceptions, attitudes, expectations, motiva-
tions, and the effectiveness of communications are
regularly measured and analyzed, the companies using
the job-organization system will have no data and lit-
tle evidence to cause them to question the soundness of
the management system which they are now using, . . A
This point seems especially appropriate for the military
where today we hear constantly of resentment against increasing
budgetary and other hierarchical pressures. These pressures re-





way of efficiency unless it can demonstrate some greater harm
that it creates. Argyris has suggested above what that harm is.
This threat is not new to the Marine Corps. In the past the
potential existed within its organizational structure to foster
the types of characteristics that he describes. But, in the
past, the inability of the commander and staff to make the syst
work as rigidly as designed has limited the fostering of these
effects. In addition, the Marine Corps has always made positive
efforts to stress the development of initiative, aggressiveness
and planning. These acted in opposition to the development of
characteristics such as dependence, passivity, and shortened
perspective that the system has the potential to generate.
While this has been done in the past through intuition
and wisdom gained from experience, it must be done in the future
because of explicit perception of the principles involved. This
is because the need to counteract such forces will be much greater
in the years ahead. The problem dimension has been radically
altered by the increase in the capacity for control of subordin-
ates by superior brought about by- the revolutionary cnange in
information technology.
Efforts in the past have been made primarily at the people
level. The Marine Corps has stressed the importance and capa-
bilities of the individual both by himself and as a member of
the team. It spends a great deal of time in leadership training
programs for the development of characteristics needed in the
crisis of battle. It must redouble its efforts in this direction
in the future through traditional and proven techniques.
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However, it should also give attention to the other
dimensions of organizational change that Leavitt suggests. It
is important how the Marine Corps uses information technology
within its organization. Further, it should examine its organ-
izational structures themselves to test their validity in the
new era. The next chapter outlines courses of action that will




MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
The Level of Data Use
The main purpose of Chapter IV was to attempt to portray
the problems of information technology. A solution is tremendous-
ly more complex. An increased use of traditional solutions was
suggested as part of the answer. A second source of assistance
can come from increased attention to the level at which data
collected is used. This has a direct bearing on organizational
structure and functioning.
There is a subtle pitfall to be aware of in setting the
level at which the data collected is used. This is the area in
which Headquarters, Marine Corps can be most effective. The
Commandant may, seemingly in keeping with sound participative
and delegation principles, set policy and ostensibly leave the
decision-making to his line subordinates* However, the Comman-
dant can then, either knowingly or unknowingly) proceed to use
his staff to exercise the control and close supervision over
subordinate functioning that he purports to avoid. This comes
about when the Commandant, aware of his unassailable right to know
what is going on, uses his staff to gather information. With
their greatly increased capability to gather data a sort of "data
collection supervision" process will increasingly come into being.
McGregor portrays this rationale as follows:
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He can delegate and yet keep control. He need not rely
on authority in the directive sense if he can assign to
someone else the responsibility: 1. for making sure his
subordinates stay within policy limits and 2. for collect-
ing and providing him with data which will enable him to
know what is happening in time to step in before serious
trouble arises.
. . .
He directs by means of policy; the decisions are
made at the point of action; his subordinates have the
freedom to make mistakes. There is no risk involved be-
cause he has a group of staff specialists who keep a
detailed eye on every important aspect of the operations.
He can concern himself with major problems. . . . Things
are "under control." If anything is not as it should be,
either the staff will see that it is corrected or notify
him so that he can take care of it before serious diffi-
culties arise.
A nice situation- or a travesty? It depends on
your theoretical assumptions. . . . The staff have now
become policemen, exercising by proxy the direct auth-
ority which was "relinquished" by the line. . . . Ingen-
ious methods for defeating staff control will be devel-
oped, and the staff will be kept busy developing new-
ones to compensate for these. Antagonisms between line
and staff will prevent the kind of collaboration that is
essential for achieving organizational objectives.!
The information collected with the new capability should
be for the use of the appropriate level, not for closer control
and supervision of lower levels by higher levels.
With respect to data and reports compiled by staff groups,
the principle of self-control requires that they be pro-
vided to each member of management for controlling his
own , not his subordinates' job. . . . Every manager is
entitled to all the detailed data he wishes for purposes
of self-control. If, however, the data are broken down
in a fashion which reveals the day-to-day performance of
individual subordinates, they are no longer data for self-
control. His use of such information vitiates the idea of
delegation completely. (The same thing is true, of course,
if he assigns to staff the responsibility of "controlling"
his subordinates by this means.) . . •
If such summary data indicates to the manager that
something is wrong within the organizational unit for which
he is responsible, he will turn not to staff, but to his
subordinates for help in analyzing the problem and correct-




locating the "culprit." If his subordinates have data
for controlling their own jobs, the likelihood is that
they will already have spotted and either corrected
the difficulty themselves or sought help in doing so.l
In the words of another author:
In a better data collection system, "information
collected" on an individual will be collected "by" him
and evaluated by him, and he will take the appropriate
action.
. . . Under these conditions, it is hoped that
the information will not tend to be perceived as com-
municating whether or not a person has failed or suc-
ceeded but as information on how he is doing.
2
The increased ability to collect data can then, with the
proper organizational climate, become an aid to the subordinate.
The burden is on the Commander at every level to use at his level
the appropriate data and to provide the subordinate with the
data appropriate to his lower level. It is when the commander,
either personnally or through his staff, uses this data as a
corrective, directive device that it becomes a threat to the sub-
ordinate.
A simplified expression of this concept would be to attempt
to ensure that the feedback principle be applied to every level
of the command structure. This involves taking positive steps
to combat the tendency towards centralization of the command
function. Higher levels could monitor subordinates but at the
same time avoid functioning in the traditional data-gathering,
edict-issuing manner. The computer combined with improved com-
munications gives us a tremendous monitoring potential. This
^McGregor, p. 161.
2Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organ -
ization
,
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 276.
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must be used with restraint for, as McGregor suggests, monitoring
can be used as destructively as more traditional directive con-
trols. Put in another way, authority is more a circular than a
hierarchical process. 1 Authority gained by insertion into the
circular information flow is a license for power. How much the
license is used and how the power gained is used will determine
the effects produced.
These principles are equally applicable to the Commandant
and to Marine commanders at every level. However, the leader-
ship in the proper use of information must come from the top.
If it does not then it will be extremely difficult for subordinate
commanders to take the right approach. Without support from the
top and recognition that errors will be made subordinates will
not be willing to risk the opportunities for error such a system
provides their subordinates. Commanders at every level must accept
the fact that if data is not to be used at the highest level
there will be resultant mistakes that they very possibly could
have avoided. However, they must also realize that:
Administrative science is concerned with efficient and
effective accomplishment of organization goals. How-
ever, the efficiency criterion must be temDered, for
the most efficient accomplishment of objectives might
conflict with the most judicious and intelligent use
of the human resource.
2
iReis, pp. 25-26.
2rocco Carzo, Jr., "Administrative Science and the Role
of Value Judgments," Current Issues and Emerging Concepts in






Changes in Staff Organization
In addition to considering how the technology is used in
an organization, the organizational structure itself should be
studied to understand its relationship to the new technology.
This last section of this chapter deals with the effects of infor-
mation technology on the general staff structure and the role
of the staff. It suggests ways to structure organizations to
better meet the challenge of data systems.
It was stated in Chapter II that a real general staff
concept includes the performance by the staff of supervision in
functional areas as assistance to the commander. It thus repre-
sents a level of authority between the commander and his subor-
dinates. Many would argue that the general staff has no command
authority but, as Reis notes, while
. . . all orders, even those involving minute details
to lower echelons, are given in the name of the com-
mander ... at the same time, . . . the fiction that
the staff officer does not command does not alter the
fact that he not only plans and issues orders, but he
also directs the details of execution, insofar as the
commander permits. ... In order to perserve unity
of command and hierarchical configuration, subordin-
ates must report to only one superior and all lines
of authority must converge on one man at the top.
But at the same time, staff officers are to have real
responsibility for their assigned functional areas.
And in order to implement their responsibility they
must have authority.
1
In the past the commander has really had no option but to
permit the staff to assume the use of some of his authority. In
the future computers may be granted similar authority. The use
iReis, pp. 22-23, 159.
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of computers as integral parts of management systems will require
a formalization of command standards. These standards can and
will then be applied to the management of units by the computer.
The computer will do this through a programmed analysis. It
will submit data collected to this analysis and detect exceptions
to the criteria it is provided. It will then indicate either the
exception or the required action appropriate to such exceptions.
Hopefully, the commander will personally establish most of these
criteria and required courses of action. Perhaps many will be
forced upon him by his superiors. In any case, the computer will
be applying standards set by someone at some level.
This is exactly what the general staff has done in the
past in its extension of the commander role. It collected data,
applied standards (either the formalized or unformalized standards
of the commander or those of the staff officer himself) and de-
tected exceptions. The exceptions were then acted upon by the
commander, or the general staff officer in his name. Since the
computer will do this we have eliminated a basic need for the
general staff and lessened the need for staff supervision in
general.
If, in keeping with this, we make a positive effort to
reduce the supervisory, decision-making function of staffs and
ultimately eliminate the general staff, the work load of the
commander may increase despite the computer's help. However,
he would not be inundated as he would have been in the past with-
out the general staff. The computer will ensure that he will
deal with only the decision-making problems identified by the
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exceptions, not with the sea of detail that has made the general
staff necessary.
Such a reduction in staff wouls probably result in some
increase in the commander's exposure to details. The volume
of work that this entails is traditionally posed as a matter in-
volving great effort and little benefit to the commander. However,
as Neustadt notes,
Presidents are always being told that they should leave
details to others. It is dubious advice. Exposure to
details of operations and policy provides the frame of
reference for details of information.!
The development of this frame of reference is critical to the role
of every commander.
Even if we eliminate entirely the general staff, the
commander will still need the special staff. Vve noted that the
coordination of the special staff was a secondary way in which
the general staff assisted the commander. Elimination of the
general staff will require the commander to deal directly with a
proliferation of special staff officers.
As was seen earlier, one of the characteristics of the
special staff was a great diversity of function. Another char-
acteristic was a high degree of specialization. Gerald G. Fisch
challenges our traditional span of control concepts that limits
the number of people a commander can supervise to a half dozen.
He points out that when there is a high degree of diversity the
commander is generally dealing with people who have very special-
ized training and these people are dealt with on a "go" - "no go"
lRichard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., I960), p. 154.
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basis. There is little supervision or training that can be done
by the commander. Under these circumstances the span 01 control
if greatly increased. This is not true in the commander's deal-
ings with subordinate commanders since in that relationship there
is more supervision and subordinate training.
1
The planning function of the general staff will also not
disappear when the general staff is gone. However, computer
programs will be developed to handle many present planning tasks.
Another solution to this problem is to create a special staff
function for planning. This has been a natural and repeated
evolution in the past- at Headquarters, Marine Corps it started
with the War Plans Section in the Division of Plans and Policies
and has risen to the level of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
and Programs. Each Special Staff member has the capability of
planning pertaining to his functional area. A new "special"
staff member concerned solely with the coordination of plans
could handle this subdivision of the present G-3 function.
We saw that the general staff also assisted the commander
through advice. The advice of a technical nature could best come
directly from these special staff officers. We already can see
the increasing recognition of this in the rising number of special
staff officers. As Mary P. Follet prophecied in 1926,
. . .
management is becoming more and more specialized;
the policies and methods of a department rest on that
department's special body of knowledge, and there is a
tendency for the responsibility to be borne by those
iGerald G. Fisch, "Stretching the Span of Management/'
Harvard Business Review , (Sept. -Oct., 1963), p. 74.
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with that special body of knowledge rather than by a
man at the top because of his official position. 1
This concept also offers us an important key to lessening
resentment of the subordinate commanders to "staffs." By eli-
minating the general staff we remove the general staff hierarchi-
cal position as the source of special staff authority. The iso-
lation of special staff sections would of itself decrease the
supervisory aura currently associated with such sections. Any
power they are able to generate would have to come in larger part
from the quality of the service they render.
The direct intercourse of the commander with his special
staff has another advantage. Each level between the commander and
those directly involved with specific problems represents a filter
for information. Each such level acts on information in passing
it along. Judgments are made in the process of reducing infor-
mation for transmittal. As a result each subsequent level takes
the judgments of lower levels and perceives them as facts. Ziarch
and Simon refer to this process as "uncertainty absorption. "2
By getting closer to the parties directly involved, the commander
can reduce this effect. This applies to operational subordinates
as well as to special staff officers. This concept is closely
allied to the problem mentioned above concerning the lack of work
!Mary P. Follett, "The Illusion of Final Authority," a
paper presented before the Taylor Society in New York, Dec. 10,
1926.
Uncertainty absorption takes place when inferences are
drawn from a body of evidence and the inferences, instead of the
evidence itself, are then communicated. James G. March and Her-




satisfaction experienced by staff members at Headquarters working
under the separation of plans and policies from execution. The
more tne staff hierarchy that surrounds and lies between the
operator and the decision-maker, the poorer the quality of the
information the decision-maker will receive and the less satis-
faction his staff will find in their work.
The aim of Chapters IV and V has been to portray an issue
that has a new dimension in our era and that is of major impor-
tance to the Marine Corps. The types of consideration portrayed
here are less obvious than some of the other reasons why the
Commandant should be vitally concerned with information processes
today. There has been a great deal of attention given to the cost
of information in command and control systems. It has been esti-
mated at ten percent of the Department of Defense expenditure.^-
However, the issues portrayed in these chapters cannot be ex-
pressed in dollar terms. It can only be said that they repre-
sent values that are priceless in combat.
l(Editors f Preface), Military Information Systems , ed.
Edward Bennett. James Degan, Joseph Spiegel (New York: Frederick





The Staff Personnel Problem
During informal conversations with those who staff Head-
quarters, Marine Corps, one constantly encounters the problem of
inadequate previous training of personnel in the functional area
to which they are assigned. It seems evident that the traditional
conflict of the staff specialist versus the line officer needs
increased attention if the Marine Corps is to adequately staff
its Headquarters. An officer corps so limited in size cannot
adequately support separate staff corps. The detail system,
properly performed, seems an appropriate solution for meeting the
Marine Corps staffing needs. However, for the detail system to
effectively meet staffing needs there must be planned, repeated
assignments of officers to the same functional area. This pro-
cess should be accompanied by appropriate schooling in this
staff specialty. Basic to making such a system effective is the
requirement that those who have responsibility for assigning offi-
cer personnel recognize and accept this goal. This also means
that the immediate whims or needs of the commander will sometimes
be tempered by the need for developing staff specialists. The
Combs Board 1 recently recommended a program of repeated assign-
iReport of a Board to Study Billet Requirements and Grade
Distribution in the Subspecialty and Specialty areas in the Navy,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated December, 1964.
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ments to a secondary career development field for Naval officers.
If the Navy with its staff corps feels this program is necessary
for it to properly fill staff billets, how much more so must it
be necessary for the Marine Corps where line officers carry almost
the entire staffing load? In summary, there is evidence, within
the Marine Corps and without, that the complexity of senior staff
billets has increased to the point where the old approach to
detailing has become simply inadequate.
Information Technology
The advent of information technology outlined in chapters
IV and V presents a problem area of major proportions for the
Commandant. The need for someone concerned with this problem
to be placed well up in the organizational hierarchy has been
described as follows:
There must be someone in tomorrow's complex
organization who is in charge of all aspects of in-
formation generating, processing, and dissemination.
It must be his responsibility to determine how man-
agement's information needs can best be met. further-
more, he must have the intellectual capacity to know
what types of analysis performed on various data will
produce information of value to the company.!
The need has already been met at the highest level in the
other services. In the Navy there is a Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy who heads the Office of Management Informa-
tion Systems. The Army has an Information and Data oystems Office
whose head is a special assistant to the Chief of Staff and who
^Gerald G. Fisch, "Stretching the Span of Management,"
Harvard Business Review
,
(Sept. -Oct., 1963), p. 13.
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reports to the Vice-Chief of Staff. In the Air jorce this function
is directly uncer the Comptroller , who is assigned a department-
wide management information responsibility.
The Marine Corps approach is in raarkea constrast with this.
Until the recent creation of the Office of the assistant Director
for Management Systems Development within the Data Systems Divi-
sion, this responsibility was assigned to the Management Engineer-
ing Branch of the Administrative Division. The mission of this
branch is
:
To provide technical assistance and analytical services
pursuant to the formulation, development, implementation,
and improvement of management systems, methods, proce-
dures and techniques.
1
Among its assigned functions is the following:
Serves as a research center to develop and evaluate
new management concepts and techniques.
2
Although the Management Engineering Branch had (and has )
this assigned mission and function, it has been located at a
level where such over-all responsibility cannot be accomplished.
This inadequacy led to the creation of a new agency, the Office
of the Assistant Director for Data Systems Development because
the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) recognized that
the need in the area of management and management information
systems was not being met. This present solution to the problem
of information systems contains two serious defects:








1. A duplication of mission has been created. The new
office has a mission that is well within that already assigned
to the Management Engineering Branch.
2. The need is still met at too low a level within the
organization. , The new Office of Management Systems Development
may have a greater chance of success, since its sponsor is a
Deputy Chief of Staff. If it does succeed it will be in spite of
the fact that the office itself is submerged within a lower
division.
Organization
There is a need for the elimination of the duplication of
effort, the confusion of responsibility, and the compounding of
people who report to the Chief of Staff. The most obvious areas
of overlap are those of the G-l with the Personnel Department and
the G-4 with the Supply Department. The elimination of this
duplication has repeatedly been recommended by organizational
studies and is overdue.! There is also a major area of overlap
between the Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans and Programs) and the
responsibilities of the G-3.
In addition to these practical aspects, the whole subject
of staff organization and functioning should be studied. In the
years ahead the use of data systems and automated quantitative
analysis techniques will have a strong influence on command struc-
3-The most recent such recommendation was made in the
Report of the Headquarters, Marine Corps Reorganization Board
dated August 1961 (the Pepper Board). It recommended a consoli-
dation of functional responsibilities under a directorate system.
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tures. These techniques cause changes in the functioning of organ-
izations at every level. How the Marine Corps organizes to meet
these changes will determine the effects that will be produced.
The changes in information processes are revolutionary. The
reactions that these changes require in organization will be of
the same dimension.
Summary
A good portion of the present organizational problems of
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps can be attributed to the aborted
installation of the general staff in 1952. Much of the remaining
portion is due to inadequate application of management principles
in the solution of problems brought about by changing times
.
To be able to command is not the same as to be able to give
effective administrative direction. The lack of a strong manage-
ment office within Headquarters suggests thatthis distinction is
not recognized. In all the history of changes in the organization
of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps the brightest spot is the
realignment brought about by the Navy Department Management
Engineer in 1943. (See Chapter I). Perhaps, after twenty two
years, Headquarters is due to have the professionals take another
look. The changes that can be forecast in the years ahead due
to information technology make the need for attention ^o the area
of organization and management one of paramount urgency.
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